Latvia Worried About Delay in NATO Baltic Expansion after Yugoslav War
May 12, 1999
SUMMARY
Latvia's President on May 11 expressed concern about his country's national
security, particularly over likely delays in further NATO expansion. This
heightened sense of insecurity is the result of three developments: 1) the
deteriorating relationship between NATO and Moscow; 2) the fact that some
Central European and Balkan countries may move ahead of the Baltic nations
in the queue to become NATO members; and 3) the need for NATO to resolve a
number of internal problems following the Kosovo crisis.
ANALYSIS
Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis said in Prague on May 11 that delays in
NATO's expansion over the next four years would endanger the security of
the Baltic states. Ulmanis called on NATO to accelerate its expansion
plans, to complete the process within two to three years. He stressed the
next NATO summit should explicitly address the issue of accepting new
members. The Latvian President is on a three-day official visit to the
Czech Republic to discuss the two countries' foreign policies and economic
relations. The Baltic states worry that once the Kosovo conflict is over
NATO will be so distracted by its own internal issues, such as reforming
its decision-making structure and reassessing its re-defined mission, that
the expansion process could delayed.
The Baltic states are concerned NATO has already sent clear signals to some
Central European and Balkan prospective member states that their support
for NATO in the Kosovo crisis could speed up their incorporation into the
alliance. Moreover, the Baltic leadership recognizes that the conflict in
the Balkans has negatively impacted NATO's relationship with Russia,
leaving the Baltic states precariously caught in the middle. The Baltic
states realize a more cautious NATO might mean pushing their prospective
membership past the original time frame, if at all.
NATO its expansion plans during NATO's 50th anniversary summit held in
Washington in April, when the alliance adopted a Membership Action Plan.
The plan was designed to intensify military cooperation with nine aspirant
states -- Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria,
Slovakia, Macedonia and Albania -- in order to prepare these countries for
future membership. Although the recent summit did not formally mention
eventual modification of the accession schedule in connection to the
assistance provided by some of these countries to NATO during the Kosovo
crisis, the alliance has made numerous statements implying that this would
occur. In particular, NATO told Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia -- the
countries that have promised to open their territories to the
transportation of NATO troops and military supplies -- that their help was
greatly appreciated and would not be forgotten in connection with NATO's
expansion.
NATO accepted Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as new members on
March 12. STRATFOR has, in earlier GIUs, highlighted the military and
logistical difficulties associated with including Hungary as a member, in
the absence of Slovakia. The alliance's strategy associated with the second
accession wave, has produced even more controversy. On the one hand, the
alliance has raised prospective new members' hopes by issuing official
statements about the direction of future expansion and by involving the
would-be members in the Partnership for Peace program. On the other hand,
NATO's progress has been extremely slow in a second expansion wave to avoid
further damaging its relations with Russia, a fierce opponent of the
alliance's eastward expansion. Other difficulties associated with future
NATO expansion include the relative absence of democratic institutions in
some of the candidate countries, economies that in some instances cannot
support the military commitment required by NATO, and the possibility that
new members will result in a further extension of the frontier NATO must
defend in order to protect the entire alliance.
The Kosovo crisis, however, will certainly exacerbate NATO's already
ambiguous policy. Following Kosovo, NATO will be hard pressed not to honor
its debts to such countries as Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia.
Simultaneously, disrupted relations with Moscow -- which has been opposing
the aspirations of the former Soviet republics to join NATO -- will make
the alliance's expansion into the Baltic region more difficult.
NATO-Russian animosity will make consolidation of NATO's defensive lines
imperative, but NATO will simultaneously put a high priority on keeping
that consolidation from further negatively impacting relations with Russia.
The Baltic states have every reason to be concerned about NATO's altered
relationship with Moscow and its impact on further expansion. But these are
not the only factors impinging on national security issues in the Baltics.
NATO will have to deal with fundamental issues such as its internal
structure, decision-making process, and reassessing its redefined mission,
once the Kosovo crisis is over. The war in the Balkans has clearly shown
that NATO's decision-making structure is incompatible with the new mission
it has laid out for itself.
NATO's new mission is another fundamental issue to be confronted following
the Kosovo crisis. The Washington summit expanded NATO's strategic
framework beyond the founding principle of mutual defense. The new
framework includes an assertion that NATO should develop a capability to
avert regional conflicts taking place beyond NATO's borders. In the wake of
the U.S.-led intervention in Yugoslavia, it is highly likely that some NATO
members will seek to reconsider this new mission.
In fact, doubts concerning the leadership of the U.S. have rekindled the
idea of the Western European Union (WEU) becoming the full-fledged military
arm of the European Union. This is already is on the table. On May 11, WEU
foreign and defense ministers agreed to design a European defense
organization within the next 18 months. All these issues will keep NATO
busy in the months to come and will, with all likelihood, delay the
alliance's expansion plans. The deteriorating relationship with Moscow, the
demands by some Central European and Balkan countries to enter NATO, and
the internal issues NATO must resolve once the crisis in Kosovo ends, will
all pose a serious question for the Baltic states and their security
